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1 Introduction 
Since 2001, the United States has engaged in an ongoing campaign to detect, 
disrupt, and dismantle Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist networks. The nature of 
the Al Qaeda (AQ) threat has required a novel and evolving military and counterterrorism 
response. No longer could the United States depend on its Cold War tactics—while the 
Soviet threat was “stationary, observable, and conventional,” Al Qaeda operations are 
“agile, unconventional, and stealthy, wag[ing] war with Microsoft, machetes, AK- 47s, 
and tribal drums.”1  
The Obama Administration has extensively used targeted killings as part of its 
counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda. Targeted killings, as defined by the UN 
special report on the topic, are intentional, premeditated acts of lethal force by states 
against specific individuals outside the states’ custody.2 The term “targeted killings” was 
popularized in 2000 after Israel made public its policy of targeting militants in Palestinian 
territories.3 Targeted killings can come in many forms, from sniper fire to submarine 
cruise missiles; however, the Obama Administration has primarily used drone and air 
strikes to target Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia.  
Although Pakistan remains the primary theater for drone warfare, the US has 
significantly increased air strikes and drone operations in Yemen to target the 
homegrown AQ affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Top US 
counterterrorism officials currently regard AQAP as the “most operationally active 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Renwick and Treverton 2008. 
2 United Nations General Assembly 2014.  
3 Ibid. 
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franchise” of Al Qaeda.4  The group has attempted several attacks against the United 
States, including most recently the plot against the American embassy in August 2013 
that resulted in the closure of over 22 other international embassies across the MENA 
region.5 However, despite its high-profile plots against the West, AQAP also operates as 
a domestic insurgency within Yemen. It regularly assassinates Yemeni government 
officials and has carried out many large-scale bombings against civilian and military 
targets in the past. Furthermore, the Yemeni state currently stands most vulnerable to 
AQAP violence due to a recent coup d’état by a Shiite rebel group that overthrew the 
sitting president and disbanded the parliament. As Yemen descends into political chaos, 
AQAP grows more opportunistic, seeking to establish sanctuaries amongst tribal factions, 
carry out violence against the weakening state, and brew an insurgency that desires 
legitimacy through political and territorial means.6 
   With a destabilizing Yemen, it is important to question whether current US 
counterterrorism measures in the region sufficiently address the threat posed by AQAP.   
While there is little empirical research on the effectiveness of US involvement in Yemen, 
an alternative small body of academic work does study the impact of American drone 
strikes in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. 
Most of these studies are working papers; nevertheless, they reveal some preliminary 
insight into the procedures political scientists use to evaluate the effect of US drone 
policy in this region.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Shaughnessy 2010.  5	  The Mercury 2013.  6	  Holtz 2015. 
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For example, Smith and Walsh measure the impact of done strikes on Al Qaeda’s 
propaganda output, which acts as a proxy for AQ’s capacity to organize political action.7 
They argue that creating propaganda requires a cadre of experienced producers, media 
workers, and ‘stars;’” thus, if drone strikes degrade this “cadre,” we would see observable 
changes in Al Qaeda’s propaganda yield.  Relying on regression analysis, the study finds 
that drone strikes might be associated with more—not less—Al Qaeda media output, 
suggesting that current US counterterrorism policy is doing little to degrade the Al Qaeda 
propaganda machine. However, since the study solely measures the impact of drone 
strikes on a single dependent variable, it does not capture the effect of this policy on other 
outcome variables—such as terrorist attacks, recruitment, fundraising—that could be a 
more holistic representative of the strength of the Al Qaeda organization.  
A recent RAND study by Johnston and Sarbahi attempts to include these 
additional variables that capture Al Qaeda’s strength in its analysis.8 The authors rely on 
a two level fixed-effects model: (1) controlling for time invariant factors by “agency”9 
fixed effects and (2) controlling for temporal variation using month fixed-effects. Under 
this framework, they use regression analysis to model the impact of drone strikes on three 
different measures of terrorist violence: number of terror incidents, number of casualties 
from terror incidents, and number of tribal leaders killed from terror incidents. Their 
study finds with statistical significance that drone strikes are associated with a reduction 
in militant violence in the FATA regions on all three outcome variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Smith 2013.  
8 Johnston 2015.  9	  Agency is the third-order division of administrative regions in FATA. It is comparable to a “county” in 
the US.	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The results of the RAND study convey that drone strikes are an effective 
counterterrorism measure in Pakistan—which aligns with the core of US policymakers’ 
arguments about their continued use—while the Smith and Walsh study implies the 
opposite conclusion. However, since both of these studies focus on Al Qaeda central, I 
question whether these results could be replicated in Yemen. With Yemen becoming 
critical to US national security, an assessment about the success of US counterterrorism 
policy in the region is necessary for officials and critics alike to evaluate the tradeoffs 
associated with drone warfare. Given the dearth of empirical research on this topic, my 
thesis will attempt to investigate the effectiveness of US strikes in disrupting, degrading, 
and dispersing AQAP violence.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of 
AQAP militancy in Yemen and the American response. Afterwards, I introduce the 
different hypotheses available within academic literature regarding the impact of targeted 
killings on terrorist and insurgent activities. Next, I develop my empirical model based on 
these hypotheses —which derives primarily from the Johnston and Sarbahi study—and 
test the hypotheses using regression analysis and GIS mapping. However, since empirical 
models may tell only half the story, I also identify qualitative evidence that challenges 
White House rhetoric regarding the effectiveness of drone strikes in Yemen. Finally, I 
conclude by offering recommendations for future empirical research on the topic, as well 
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2 AQAP Militancy in Yemen and the American Response 
2.1 The Formation of AQAP  
It is common for radical jihadist groups to seek legitimacy under the Al Qaeda 
brand, despite the fact that most of these groups hold limited ties to Al Qaeda Central.10 
However, AQAP is not similar to these other off-shoot organization.11 Although AQAP 
presents itself to be a spontaneous political movement, in reality, it is a carefully 
managed organization with roots to Al Qaeda-Central that pre-date the September 11 
attacks by over a decade.  Furthermore, although AQAP is often viewed as a purely 
terrorist organization, in reality, AQAP also acts an insurgency that uses militant violence 
as a vehicle to delegitimize and fragment the Yemeni state. 12 
The AQAP branch of al Qaeda has a history that can be traced back to the 1980s, 
when Bin Laden came to Yemen from the Afghan Mujahedeen looking for a new jihad to 
unite the Arab world. In Afghanistan, Bin Laden had commanded a group of volunteer 
foreign fighters called the “Afghan Arabs” that sought to oust the Soviet invaders and 
build a Sharia Afghanistan.13 However, after the Soviet retreat, Afghanistan fell into civil 
war between various mujahedeen commanders, forcing Bin Laden to find new ground to 
develop a Pan-Arab jihad. He was drawn to southern Yemen, the birthplace of his father, 
where a radical Marxist faction had disbanded the tribal sultanates to create the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Byman 2012. 5 
11 Ibid, 6. 
12 Simcox 2012. 
13Johnsen 2013. 21 
14 Ibid 17. 
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Bin Laden’s obsession of recreating the Afghan Mujahedeen in Yemen sowed the 
seeds for the al Qaeda organization.15 Yemeni tribes had supplied many fighters to the 
mujahedeen, who returned home from battle only to find their country riddled with 
corruption and poverty.16  Wandering without much purpose yet still filled with the 
adrenaline of war, these men were attracted to Bin Laden’s cause: a borderless coalition 
built to protect all Muslims from the influence of the West.17 
Bin Laden used his Yemeni connections to coordinate the USS Cole bombing in 
2000 that took the lives of 17 sailors and left 39 injured. Faced with increasing 
international scrutiny regarding the events surrounding the bombing, the Yemeni 
government began to arrest anyone suspected of harboring sympathies for Al Qaeda.18 
Men who had spent time in Afghanistan, particularly those that returned to Yemen in the 
weeks surrounding the attacks, were obvious targets; but, the list quickly expanded to 
include all young men deemed to be security threats in governorates across the country. 19 
Within months Yemen’s jails were filled with suspects, many of whom the government 
denied fair trials. Some of the suspects were experienced militants, who worked fiercely 
to radicalize their younger more impressionable fellow inmates. 20 Predictably, young 
men left Yemen’s security prisons more radical than when they were initially 
incarcerated. 21 Their arbitrary persecution provoked them to harbor serious grievances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ibid, 20 
16 A False Foundation, 26 
17 Johnsen 2013. 20 18	  Ibid. 
19 Johnsen 2014.  
20 Ibid. 21	  Ibid.	  
Ganesh	   7	  
against the Yemeni government, which only further ripened them for AQAP 
recruitment.22 
In 2006, 23 men escaped from a prison in Sana’a and created al Qaeda in the 
Land of Yemen (AQLY), with nearly all of the escapees forming the core leadership of 
the group. 23 On September 17, 2008, AQLY attacked the US Embassy in Sana’a using 
synchronized suicide bombings, leaving 18 dead. 24  This attack brought the group 
domestic and international attention, which coincided with the AQLY’s decision to 
publish statements online and via its Arabic-language magazine, Sada al-Malahim, after 
its successful plot.25 This “attack-and-response” mechanism became signature of the 
group, as it continued to innovatively use multimedia platforms to communicate with the 
Arabic and Western world. 
The internet especially played an important role for AQLY in 2009, when the 
group announced its merged with Saudi jihadists through a video, promising that this new 
organization called “al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula” will topple "apostate" governments 
and drive Western influence out of the region.26  The video hailed praised fighters who 
had been killed over the past few years by the Yemeni, Saudi and American 
governments, declaring “we will tread their path until we establish the Islamic state... 
until we establish the laws of Allah, or until our blood mixes with theirs.” 27 
 The AQAP merger facilitated the group’s broader global aims now that Saudi and 
Yemeni jihadists could find sanctuary in a united, umbrella organization. Nevertheless, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 
23 Zimmerman 2015.  24	  Bauer 2008.	  
25 Byman 2014. 49. 
26 A False Foundation, 31 
27 "Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." Al Jazeera, May 9, 2012. 
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AQAP’s historic roots to Yemen and the Afghan Mujahedeen continued to play an 
important role in the group’s local ambitions. Furthermore, since the 2009 merger, 
AQAP has aggressively coopted mechanisms from its Yemeni predecessors, such as: 
using Western media platforms, relying on non-hierarchical command structures, 
building borderless transnational coalitions, and seeking local political objectives while 
promoting an international jihad.  
 
2.2 US Counterterrorism in Yemen 
The US conducted its first drone strike in Yemen in 2002 to target Qaed Sinan 
Harithi, an al Qaeda operative suspected to have been one of the masterminds behind the 
USS Cole bombing.28 The attack took the lives of six people—one of them a US 
citizen—which provoked domestic and international outrage over the legality of this 
extrajudicial killing. 29  Furthermore, news sources also discovered the Yemeni 
government’s collusion with the US in coordinating and covering up the drone attack, 
which elicited serious domestic backlash.30 The then president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, “furious at being made to look like a liar and a puppet of the Americans” decided 
to end the US drone campaign in Yemen that same year. 31 As Figure 1 shows, Yemen 
did not see another U.S. strike for nearly 7 years since the 2002 debacle.  
 Nevertheless, the 2002 attack set precedent for US involvement in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, where the Bush administration significantly ramped up drone surveillance 
and drone strikes to target the Al Qaeda Central organization and the Taliban. In 2010, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The Washington Post 2002. 	  29Ibid.	  30Berger, 2013. 12 
31 Ibid. 
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the Obama Administration restarted the drone campaign in Yemen after AQAP claimed 
responsibility for several terrorist plots against the US. This included the attempted 
Christmas Day bombing of 2009, where AQAP operative Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
tried to set off a bomb sewn into his underwear on a Northwest Airlines flight traveling to 
Detroit.32 If the bomb had actually exploded—instead of just setting Abdulmutallab pants 
on fire—it could have been the most devastating terrorist attack against the US since 
9/11.  
 As AQAP’s strength grew in Yemen—and as its foreign terrorist plots became 
more formidable threats—the Obama Administration significantly increased US drone 
and air strikes in Yemen from 2010 onwards. Figure 1 shows that the US conducted over 
50 strikes in Yemen in 2012; however, from 2013 onwards, we see a comparable decline 
in the number of strikes. The Bureau of Investigation attributes this decline to the general 
presence of civil unrest within Yemen, which made intelligence collection and the 
execution of US operations particularly difficult.33 It is also possible that international 
backlash played a role dissuading the US from engaging in a more extensive drone 
campaign in Yemen.34  Nevertheless, the Obama administration continues to assert that 
Yemen serves as a “model” for US counterterrorism strategy. In order to analyze the 
verity of this assertion, the following chapter will explore several hypotheses available in 
academia that could provide a foundation in evaluating the success of the American 
drone and air campaign against AQAP in Yemen. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Ibid. 
33 Serle, 2015	  
34 UN News Center 2013. 
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3 Hypotheses 
  AQAP uses a variety of tactics to achieve its insurgent goals. However, since it 
has tenuous political reach and little territorial control, it is motivated to rely on selective 
violence against both the state and civilians in order to advance its cause.35 This behavior 
derives from Kalyvas’ “logic of violence”, which asserts that weak insurgents are 
incentivized to use selective violence—targeting specific people and institutions based on 
their loyalties and affiliations—to deter civilian defectors, damage the state, and 
consolidate political control in contested areas.36 As AQAP is a weak insurgent—it does 
not control significant land and it operates in many factions across Yemen—measuring 
its violence can reasonably act as a proxy for measuring its organizational strength and 
capability. With violence as the key variable in mind, this chapter will discuss the 
different hypotheses available in academic literature regarding the relationship between 
targeted killings and militant violence. 
  
3.1. Do US strikes increase AQAP violence in Yemen? 
By the “logic of violence,” since the presence of US strikes threatens AQAP’s 
sanctuaries in Yemen, thus AQAP responds to this threat by attacking potential 
information channels and by protecting itself from .37 The military and the CIA collect 
intelligence for drone strikes in Yemen using both reconnaissance and surveillance from 
the air, and on-the-ground human intelligence (HUMINT) networks built by civilian 
spies. While AQAP has little influence in diverting drone surveillance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Kalyvas 2006.	  36	  Ibid.	  37	  Ibid.	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reconnaissance, it does have the ability to dismantle HUMINT by selectively targeting 
and punishing perceived spies and defectors for past and future U.S. strikes. Thus, we 
would expect that drone strikes would increase militant violence against civilians deemed 
disloyal or dangerous to the AQAP cause. 
         Along the same line, AQAP also seeks to punish the Yemeni government its role 
in facilitating the US drone program. After 9/11, the former Yemeni president, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, signed an agreement with the United States to “generally permit “drone 
and air strikes in Yemen.38 His successor, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, continued to abide 
by this agreement and even publicly acknowledged his coordination with the US in 
approving each strike.39 As AQAP already seeks to delegitimize and fragment the state, 
the Yemeni government’s endorsement of the US drone program adds another grievance 
for the group to fight for. 
         Furthermore, AQAP holds territorial goals in certain governorates, where it has 
built relationships with tribal leaders and local population through public service, inter-
marriage, and coercion. 40  However, several of the AQAP strongholds still remain 
contested spaces by the Yemeni state and other rebel groups. Now, as drone strikes 
further jeopardize AQAP strongholds, it is expected that the group would seek more 
violent means to reestablish its legitimacy within these contested places. 
         Thus, by the “logic of violence”, the presence of drone strikes in Yemen prompt 
insurgents to attack civilians, damage the state, and defend its right to rule in contested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,” 6.	  39	  Ibid.	  40	  Johnsen 2014.	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space. Therefore, I put forward the following that drone strikes increase terrorist 
violence: 
 
H1= drone strikes increase terrorist violence 
         
3.2 Do drone strikes disrupt AQAP violence in Yemen? 
One of the main arguments against drone warfare is that civilian casualties could 
inspire anti-American sentiments and unintentionally produces more recruits for the 
militant movement. President Obama addressed the issue of civilian casualties in a May 
2013 speech, claiming that the US follows a set of guidelines before deciding to pursue a 
drone strike.  One of the guidelines required “near certainty that no civilians will be killed 
or injured—the highest standard we can set.”41  
Nevertheless, the administration has faced mounting criticism about the civilian 
“collateral damage” resulting from air and drone strikes.  In December 2013, four U.S. 
hellfire missiles hit a gathering outside the city of Rad’aa in the Al Bayda governorate 
and killed twelve people.42 A Human Rights Watch report on the attack asserted that 
drone had mistakenly attacked a wedding convoy and killed multiple civilians.43 On the 
other hand, the Obama Administration claimed that all the casualties were high-level 
“militants” and that no civilians had been harmed.44 These diverging accounts reflect the 
ongoing debate about how the U.S. defines “civilian” and “militant”, which becomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41Obama, 2013 
42 Draper, 2014	  43	  “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,” 6	  44	  Ibid. 	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central to the question of whether the drone program utilizes discriminate violence or 
indiscriminate violence. 
 
3.21 Disruption in Discriminate Violence  
While discriminate violence targets specific individuals within an insurgency, 
indiscriminate violence targets all people, including civilians, assumed to be part of the 
insurgency, whether by their geography, religion, ethnicity, or by distinguishing physical 
factors.45 According to U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24, a successful 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy should use force discriminately in order to avoid 
civilian backlash. 46  A COIN operation that involves excessive fore and ignores 
“population-centric” strategies could inadvertently drive civilians to the insurgent cause.47     
Similarly, scholars also find that when a state uses discriminate violence against 
insurgents, a civilian population faces a private risk and a costly sanction—including 
physical injury or death—in joining an insurgent cause.48 Therefore, civilians are more 
motivated to act as “free-riders” rather than active participants of the insurgency. Thus, 
when an organization cannot access a large civilian base of support due to this collective 
action problem, it is forced to rely on a small number of militants to match the output of 
its larger counterparts. 49This could prove to be an unsustainable strategy, especially as it 
exposes a small insurgent base to the high organizational costs of coordinating attacks, 
and the high risk of death and injury from carrying out these attacks. 50 Thus, when a state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Lyall 2009, 332.	  46	  FM 3-24 2006, 1-57	  47	  Ibid, 1-4.	  
48 Wood 2003. 
49 Wood 2003. 
50 Lyall 2009, 337. 
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wields discriminate violence, civilians are less likely to join the insurgent cause, which 
diminishes and disrupts the insurgent’s capabilities. 
In the case of the U.S. involvement in Yemen, drone and air strikes can be viewed 
as measures of discriminate violence, where the U.S. only targets a select number of 
AQAP leaders and operatives in order to disrupt its network.  In a 2012 speech to the 
Wilson Center, John Brennan—the current CIA Director and former Homeland Security 
Advisor to President Obama—outlined the selective nature of targeted strikes: 
Targeted strikes conform to the principle of necessity, the requirement 
that the target have definite military value. In this armed conflict, 
individuals who are part of al Qaeda or its associated forces are 
legitimate military targets... With the unprecedented ability of 
remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a military objective while 
minimizing collateral damage, one could argue that never before has 
there been a weapon that allows to distinguish more effectively 
between an Al Qaeda terrorist and innocent civilians….Targeted 
strikes conform to the principle of proportionality, the notion that the 
anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in 
relation to the anticipated military advantage. By targeting an 
individual terrorist or small numbers of terrorist with ordinance that 
can be adapted to harming others in the immediate vicinity, it is hard 
to imagine a tool that can better minimize the risk to civilians than 
remotely piloted aircraft.51 
  
Empirical research also seems to indicate that drone strikes produce considerably lower 
civilian casualties in comparison to on-the-ground combat missions. A University of 
Massachusetts study found civilian deaths from drone attacks ranged between 4-20 
percent of all deaths, while for most military conflicts in the past two decades, civilian 
deaths ranged from 33-80 percent of all deaths.52 If the prerogative of U.S. involvement 
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in Yemen is to maximize military advantage and minimize civilian casualties, then drone 
and air strikes in this region can be viewed as forms of discriminate violence. As much of 
academic literature argues the effectiveness of discriminate violence in disrupting the 
insurgent group, I can reasonably hypothesize that the use of air and drone strikes also 
disrupt AQAP’s activities. 
  
H2= U.S. Strikes disrupt AQAP 
  
3.22 Disruption and Indiscriminate Violence 
  On the other hand, The UN and several human rights organizations argue that 
U.S. use of extrajudicial air and drone strikes could be classified as indiscriminate 
violence. A recent report co-sponsored by Stanford and NYU argues that the US 
government fails to acknowledge a significant number of non-combatant casualties from 
drone strikes in an attempt to “shield the drone program from democratic 
accountability.”53 The study also asserts the Pakistani civilians remain unaware of why 
they are subject to drone strikes; thus, when they witness the unwarranted death of 
friends or family members, it “breed[s] resentment and discontent towards the US,” 
which inadvertently aid “‘militant’ recruitment and motivate[e] terrorist activity.”54 
Under this narrative—where innocent civilians fear death by the state, despite their 
allegiance to the state—could be seen as a form of indiscriminate violence. 
Scholars largely agree that in the presence of indiscriminate violence, the civilian 
population faces a higher cost for not joining an insurgency, either because they (1) begin 	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to hold new grievances against the state and seek revenge (2) they already fear death at 
the hands of the state; thus, they are motivated to join the insurgency if it could offer 
them some measure of protection against the state.55 Thus, if more civilians abandon the 
state in favor of the insurgent, it is reasonable to assume that the insurgency—armed with 
greater membership—could increase its capabilities and gain more momentum. 
David Kilcullen, former advisor to General David Patraeus, stated, “every one of 
these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and 
more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes 
have increased.”56 If the Yemeni civilian population view US strikes in their homeland as 
a form of indiscriminate violence, then I could hypothesize that these civilians would be 
motivated to support the AQAP insurgency, which in turn increases AQAP capabilities. 
Thus, I proffer: 
  
H3: US Strikes do not disrupt AQAP activities. 
           
3.3. Degradation of AQAP 
         Another hypothesis put forth in both foreign policy and academic settings involve 
estimating the relationship between leadership decapitation—where top leaders within 
the organization’s hierarchy are targeted—and the sustainability of an organization. From 
analyzing 298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1954-2004, Jordan finds that 
leadership decapitation does not increase the likelihood of collapse in large organizations 
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or groups motivated by religious grievances.57 Furthermore, AQAP—which is motivated 
by religious grievances—also carefully, organizes itself in networks rather than in 
hierarchies, so that the several fragmented cells operate under the AQAP umbrella. 
58 Studies how that leadership decapitation does not undermine such decentralized 
organizations because the lack of hierarchy allows them to become adaptable—when one 
leader is killed, another one emerges.59  
In the case of Yemen, many assumed that the death of AQAP’s principal strategist 
and top foreign recruiter, Anwar Awalki, would lead to the downfall of AQAP as an 
organization. During his reign, Awlaki authored, designed, and published al Qaeda’s first 
English language magazine, “Inspire”, and maintained a heavy online presence through 
Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube.60 However, despite his death, as of 2013, the U.S State 
Department estimates the organization has "close to a thousand members”, representing 
dramatic growth from some two-to-three-hundred members in 2009--many of them from 
foreign countries.61 On September 27, 2014, AQAP conducted a rocket attack on the US 
embassy, and publically stated, "the attack came as a response of an American drone's 
targeting of Muslim children in a bombardment that occurred on Friday evening in al 
Jawf that resulted in their being wounded severely.”62 
 Thus, it seems that despite targeted killings against high-valued individuals, 
AQAP continues to function and pose a threat against both local and foreign interests. 
Therefore, I put forth the following hypothesis: 
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H4: US strikes do not degrade AQAP capabilities 
 
On the other hand, a diverging line of academic literature argues that leadership 
decapitation can have crippling effects on an organization. Johnston found that leadership 
decapitation does not lead to an increase in militant violence, and that it is associated with 
lower frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks.63 Along the same line, another study 
finds that leadership decapitation can especially undermine terrorist groups due to their 
reliance on violence, their lack of public support, and their focus on ideology.64 Thus, if 
leadership decapitation makes an organization susceptible to degradation and 
destabilization, it follows: 
 
H5: US strikes degrade AQAP capabilities 
  
3.4 Duration of AQAP violence  
How does the impact of drone strikes vary over time? Jaeger and Siddique use 
lagged dependent variables to address this question; however, they failed to find a 
consistent temporal relationship between drone strikes and terrorist violence in 
Afghanistan.65 On the other hand, Johnston and Sarbahi find that drone strikes in Pakistan 
have both short and long-term violence reducing effect in Pakistan.66 However, can this 
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scenario apply to Yemen? Thus, the following hypotheses address the temporal impacts 
of US strikes 
 
H6: US Strikes reduce AQAP violence in the long-term 
H7: US Strikes increase AQAP violence in the long-term 
 
3.5 Dispersion of AQAP Violence: 
 Johnston and Sarbahi in their study question whether the presence of drone strikes 
in Pakistan divert Taliban violence to neighboring areas. They argue that militants, in 
their desperation to seek safety from drones, move their operations to ungoverned 
space—particularly where mountainous geography can provide camouflage from drone— 
or to urban jungles, where they are able to blend in with civilians in order to avoid 
detection. This theory could also hold true in Yemen, where AQAP operatives might seek 
safe havens in more urban or more rural areas when their initial base of operations come 
under fire. If US Strikes prompt AQAP to physically shift bases, I would expect a 
geographic shift in AQAP violence. 
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4 Empirical Strategy and Results 
In this chapter, I describe the methodology to estimate the effect of drones on a 
number of variables. The analysis will look at data from 2010-2013, and attempt to 
understand how drone and air strikes in Yemen affect AQAP capabilities in a given 
governorate and unit of time. 
  
 
4.1 Identifying Assumptions 
The study uses panel-data with the unit of analysis “governorate-month”, where 
each variable is observed at several points in time. Panel data is useful in alleviating 
suspicions regarding the outcome variables dependency on unobserved explanatory 
variables that correlate with observed explanatory variables.67 For example, the presence 
of inter-governorate variation from unobservable variables (like terrain, climate, tribal 
demographics, proximity to trading hubs) could affect the number of AQAP attacks in a 
given governorate.  
Thus, by controlling for governorates, I am able to control for time-invariant 
factors that could lead to omitted variable bias. Similarly, by controlling for “month”, I 
can control for temporal variation (like secular time trends in violence) that could bias the 
timing of terrorist attacks. As Figure 2 shows, the monthly trends in AQAP violence 
differ year by year, indicating that the “month-year” fixed-effects should be used in order 
to account for the variation of months between years. For example, parliamentary 
elections in Yemen took place in the April of 2012, but did not take place April of 2011. 
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Assuming that election months could impact the levels of AQAP violence, I am unable to 
treat April of 2011 and 2012 the same in my model. Introducing a month-year fixed 
effects could partially alleviate this problem of heteroskedasticity, allowing for my 
coefficients to retain more internal validity. 
Thus, using this two-level fixed effects model  (2LFE) with a “governorate-
month-year” unit of analysis will allow me to control for variation for a number of 
immeasurable temporal and time-invariant variables, providing me with a more honest 
estimate of the causal relationship between U.S. strikes and terrorist violence.  
However, estimating this causal relationship could be problematic if the outcome 
variable and the predictor variable are endogenous. Do drone strikes affect terrorist 
incidents or do terrorist incidents affect drone strikes? The latter hypothesis could be 
valid if drone strikes are not conducted at random, but are premeditated, direct, time-
sensitive responses to terrorist incidents. However, Johnston and Sarbahi argue that the 
decision to strike depend on several exogenous variables unrelated to terrorist incident 
outcome variable.68 While Johnston and Sarbahi concede that drone strikes are not 
conducted at random, they argue that “weather, bureaucratic, and technological factors” 
make drone strikes at least “quasi-random” when treated under a small temporal unit of 
analysis, such as week-to-week, or in my case, month-to-month.69 Thus, the presence of 
the exogenous factors make month-to-month incidences of AQAP attacks only weakly 
related to the decision to strike a target. 
First, several lengthy legal and bureaucratic procedures—which could extend 
beyond the month–by-month window for my analysis—affect the timing of a strike.  The 	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U.S. does not conduct “personality strikes”—targeted strikes against senior and mid-level 
AQAP militants—at random but through a set of defined bureaucratic processes. It 
should be noted that “personality strikes” are different from “signature strikes,” which 
target “groups of men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated 
with terrorist activity, but whose identities are not known.”70 The Obama Administration 
approved signature strikes in Yemen in 2012, but U.S. officials insist that this tactic was 
not been employed in 2012 or 2013.71  For this reason, I will make the assumption that all 
strikes carried out in Yemen from 2010-2013 were personality strikes. 
In order for a personality strike to take place, the target must be part of a “kill-list 
matrix” that includes the “names of terrorism suspects arrayed against an accounting of 
the resources being marshaled to track them down, including sealed indictments and 
clandestine operations.”72 Gregory McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine University, 
published a study in the Georgetown Law Review outlining the procedures involved with 
nominating a target to the “kill list matrix.” 
 First, military and intelligence officials from various agencies compile 
data and make recommendations based on internal vetting and 
validation standards. Second, those recommendations go through the 
NCTC, which further vets and validates rosters of names and other 
variables that are further tailored to meet White House standards for 
lethal targeting. Third, the President’s designee (currently the 
counterterrorism adviser) convenes an NSC deputies meeting to get 
input from senior officials, including top lawyers from the appropriate 
agencies and departments, such as the CIA, FBI, DOD, State 
Department, and NCTC…Finally, if the NSC gives approval, the 
President’s counterterrorism advisor shapes the product of the NSC’s 
deliberations and seeks final approval from the President. At this stage, 
targets are evaluated again to ensure that target information is complete 	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and accurate, targets relate to objectives, the selection rationale is clear 
and detailed, and collateral damage concerns are highlighted.73 
 
Thus, JSOC and the CIA both must follow all the aforementioned procedures before 
striking a target. While no information has been provided as to average amount of time it 
takes for a target to become part of the kill-list matrix, it is known that the NCTC reviews 
its recommendations every three months with intelligence analysts and military 
officials.74 Ultimately, several bureaucratic factors exogenous to the incidents of terror in 
a month-to-month window could affect the timing of a strike, adding to the “quasi-
randomness” of the independent variable. 
Weather and terrain play an important role in the ability of a pilot or UAV to 
strike a target. Cloudy weather patterns and mountainous terrain could affect the UAV’s 
visibility and situational awareness, impeding the pilot’s capacity to locate a target and 
deliver missiles to that target in the most precise manner—which adds another 
randomness factor to the timing of drone strikes.  
Militants are also aware of when they are most susceptible to drone strikes, as 
evidenced by Osama Bin Laden’s memos where he urged his operatives to “move only 
when clouds are heavy” and live in locations with “rougher terrain…many mountains, 
rivers, and trees… [which] will defend the brothers from the aircraft.” 75 In another 
memo, a Yemeni AQAP operative advised militants to “deceive the drone by entering 
places of multiple entrances or exits;” “[jam] and [confuse] electronic communication” of 
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the drone;“[use] underground shelters;” “[use] smoke as cover by burning tires.76” Such 
tactics of diversion delay the drone operators’ ability to properly identify targets, which 
in turn, detracts from the window of opportunity for a strike. Furthermore, if a target 
believes he is under surveillance by a non-weaponized ISR drone—which is 
distinguishable by its low altitude—then he would be motivated to employ these 
diversion techniques and “lose the tail” before a weaponized drone could be summoned 
for a strike.77 
 The FM 3-60 states that it is the prerogative drone operator to avoid incidental 
harm to nearby civilians, civilian property, “structures on the immediate area, targets that 
are on the no-stroke and/or restricted target list, livestock, the civil air, and anything that 
could have a negative effect on military operations.”78 Therefore, drone operators survey 
targets for an extended amount of time, which—along with the bureaucratic processes, 
weather patterns, terrain, militant diversion tactics, and logistical limitations of ISR 
drones—amplify the randomness involved in the decision to strike in a given month. 
Thus, a strike in the treatment month could plausibly occur in the preceding or following 
governorate-month, making monthly comparisons of differences in militant violence 
across governorates and month using panel-data econometric estimation a credible means 
of causal identification.  
 
4.2 Data and Variables 
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 In order to develop the key independent variable, the count of drone and air 
strikes in Yemen, I gathered data using the New America Foundation’s (NAF) 
International Security database.  Each NAF data point supplies information about the date 
of the strike, the type of strike, the location (including city, and governorate), and 
estimates of civilians and militants killed. 79 
The NAF provides a reliable measure for U.S. strikes as it uses an “aggregation of 
credible news reports” from major international wire services such as Associated Press 
and Reuters; South Asian and Middle Eastern TV networks such as GeoTV and Al 
Jazeera; Western media outlets such as the BBC and The New York Times, and leading 
regional newspapers and networks within Yemen.80 
A data point must pass several thresholds before being included into the NAF 
database. The NAF only includes a strike if there are at least “two credible media sources 
verifying a strike”, and “four credible media sources per strike”. 81 If there are multiple 
drone strikes that occur within two hours in the same location, the NAF counts it as one 
strike. If there are multiple strikes that occur in different locations, then they are counted 
as separate strikes.  
However, I noticed that the NAF website was sometimes inactive and slow to 
update its data.  Therefore I decided to cross-reference the NAF database with the Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism’s (BIJ) database in order to create the variable, STRIKE, 
which counts all confirmed U.S. air and drone strikes. The BIJ holds similar standards as 
the NAF in its reporting of U.S. strikes in Yemen. However, the BIJ also maintains an 
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active database as “both the timelines and casualty counts change” as “new information 
on a particular strike or action can emerge months or years after an event.” 82   
In order to develop the dependent variable “INCIDENT”, I assembled the counts 
of AQAP terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets using University of 
Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  GTD is an open-source database that 
includes systematic data on domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist 
incidents from 1970 to 2003.83 Each GTD incident marked under “AQAP” includes 
information on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used, the nature of the 
target, and the number of casualties. 84 
Using both civilian and military targets allows me to better assess AQAP’s overall 
capabilities as both an insurgency and a terrorist cell.  Military targets reflect AQAP’s 
insurgent interest in delegitimizing, paralyzing, and fragmenting the state.85 On the other 
hand, civilian targets represent AQAP’s use of selective violence, which Kalyvas  regards 
as aggression towards individuals perceived as spies or informants within the insurgent’s 
zone of control.86 Civilian attacks include attacks against tourists from other countries.  
Along the same lines, examining the lethality of AQAP attacks could provide 
another proxy for understanding AQAP capabilities.  Thus, I created the variable 
“LETHALITY” that incorporates GTD data on total casualties from each incident. 
Higher number of casualties from an incident could indicate higher level of planning, 
greater financing, and use of more sophisticated weapons such as Improvised Explosive 
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Devices (IEDs) or Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). 87 Thus,  
“LETHALITY” could allow me to explore death toll trends of incidents, which could 
serve as an indicator for measuring AQAP’s organizational strength over time. 
Table 1 summarizes the statistics of all the variables I have gathered data for. I 
focus on three independent variables, (1) number of air and drone strikes  (2) resulting 
casualties and (3) senior al Qaeda members killed, along with two independent variables 
that measure terrorist activity: (1) number of AQAP incidents and (2) lethality of attacks.  
 
● STRIKE: number of drone strikes given a governorate and month 
● HVI: number of senior leaders killed by a strike in a given governorate and month  
(source: New America Foundation)88 
● INCIDENT: total number of AQAP attacks in a given governorate and month 
● LETHALITY: total number of people killed or injured by AQAP attacks in a 
given governorate and month 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Graphs: 
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 I constructed a governorate-month dataset spanning from January 2010 to 
December 2013. The summary statistics for the variables discussed in the previous 
section are presented in Table 1.  
 Figure 3,4,5,6 and 7 depict the yearly trends in US strikes and AQAP attacks for 
Yemen.  Given the high degree of positive correlation illustrated in some of the years (as 
seen in Figure 3 and 4), it is difficult to say with any certainty that the empirical model is 
not endogenous. However, since Figures 3 and 5 do not show a high degree of 
correlation, I will assume, for the purpose of this paper, that drone strikes are exogenous. 
If they are endogenous, the empirical model in this paper would need to be revised.  
 
4.4 Estimation and Results 
For the following analysis, I estimate a two-level fixed effects at the governorate 
and month levels in order to test the causal relationship between incident (and incident 
related variables) and strike (and strike related variables). In order to estimate spillover 
effects—particularly the displacement of violence after drone strikes—I also conduct 
spatial analysis using GIS mapping. Spatial analysis could reveal trends as to whether 
presence of strikes in a given governorate prompts terrorists to shift their base of 
operation to another governorate. This shift could be estimated by mapping terror 
incidents and U.S. strikes and finding geographic patterns between the two variables 
This study does not rely on an OLS linear regression because the outcome 
variable INCIDENT violates certain OLS assumptions. Each INCIDENT data point 
represents the number of incidents that happened in a given governorate and during a 
given month. Given the infrequent occurrence of terrorist attacks in certain months and/or 
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governorates, and the impossibility of having negative terrorist attacks, the INCIDENT 
variable is censored at “0” as shown in Figures 7 and 8. Since OLS assumes that the 
dependent variable is a continuous value and normally distributed, a regular linear 
regression will not produce the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).    
On the other hand, the Poisson and Negative Binomial models are designed to 
analyze count data, particularly when the data is intrinsically heteroskedastic, with the 
variance increasing near the mean. While the Poisson model assumes that the conditional 
variance of the dependent variable is equal to the conditional variance of the mean, the 
Negative Binomial Regression model accounts for the overdispersion of the data.89 In this 
case, I use both Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression models depending on 
whether a model passes the Pearson Goodness of Fit test. If after a running a Poisson 
regression I find that the model does not fit the Pearson test (particularly if the p<.05)  




 In order to test hypotheses 1,2, and 3, I used INCIDENT and LETHALITY as 
measures of AQAP violence, and modeled how US strikes impact these measures. 
Violence provides a reasonable proxy for AQAP capabilities—expectedly, the stronger 
the organization, the more attacks it is able to carry out. Thus, the following regressions 
will attempt to analyze whether US strikes disrupt AQAP violence, which in turn could 
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tell a bigger story about the impact of strikes on the capacity and capabilities of the 
AQAP organization.  
 
log Incidenti = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate +  ei 
log Incidenti = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate + β3Month + ei 
log Incidenti = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate + β4Month*Year +  ei 
 
Since all the coefficients from this regression will be reflected in logs, I will 
transform the coefficients to Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR), where one minus the 
coefficient equals the percentage change in the dependent variable when there is a one-
unit increase in the independent variable.  
 The constant β0 reflects the percentage change in incident in given governorate 
and month when there are no strikes. The coefficient β1 examines the percentage change 
in incident when there is a one-unit change in US strikes. The coefficient β2 shows the 
differential percentage change in incident within each governorate; β3 shows the 
differential percentage change between each month; β4  shows the differential percentage 
change between each month-year.  
 Does the use of air and drone strikes in Yemen disrupt AQAP violence? Table 2 
presents coefficients of the variable STRIKE on the outcome variable INCIDENT 
modeled under three different regressions.  The first regression includes only governorate 
fixed effects; the second includes governorate and month fixed effects; the third one 
includes governorate and month-year fixed effects. 
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While the above regressions models are able to control for a number of 
unobservable factors through time and cross-sectional fixed effects, they do not account 
for variables that trend differentially by governorate and month-year. This includes 
certain economic and political variables--such as unemployment, GDP, youth population, 
tribal affiliations, elections, and presence of other insurgent groups—whose exclusion 
could possibly bias the coefficient on STRIKE. For example, in the observed years of 
2010-2013, the monthly unemployment rate of one governorate could have grown at a 
different rate than the monthly unemployment rate of another governorate.  However, I 
am unable to explore governorate-level trends in monthly unemployment, as the Yemen 
government does not publish these statistics. Therefore, my model operates under the 
assumption that the trends in monthly unemployment rate, along with the aforementioned 
variables, do not vary at the governorate-level. Thus, the results of the following 
regressions must be interpreted with caution due to possible threats to validity from the 
heteroskedasticity of unobserved variables at the cross-sectional level. 
 The first regression shows, with statistical significance, that a one unit increase in 
STRIKE results in a 38.2% likelihood of a terrorist incident in a given governorate and 
month. However, since this regression does not account for secular time trends and 
variation between the different months and years, the coefficient is subject to omitted 
variable bias; thus, it might not capture the true causal relationship between the US 
strikes and AQAP attacks. The second regression--which controls for month trends--also 
yields a statistically significant coefficient: a 34.06% likelihood of a terrorist incident 
when there is a one unit increase in “strike.” While this coefficient accounts for monthly 
trends--like fighting seasons and changes in climate--it fails to account for variation of 
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months between years. The third regression addresses the problem of inter-month-year 
variation, and yields an estimate--at the 10 percent significance level--of a 17.02% 
likelihood of a terrorist attack when there is a one unit increase in “strike.” 
In order to compare which model fits the data best, I use the Akaike Information 
Criteria, where  AIC =−2log(L) + 2p, where p is the number of parameters of the model.91 
The smaller the AIC of a model, the better the fit. The conventional wisdom for AIC 
comparisons indicates that two models should only be significantly different if the 
difference between the AICs exceeds by 10.92 In this case, the difference between the 
third regression and second regression exceeds by over 100, indicating that the third 
regression yields the best fitting model.  
Thus, the third regression offers the best estimate of the causal relationship 
between AQAP attacks and drone strikes. However, since the β1 coefficient from this 
regression is significant only at the 10 percent-level, I am not confidently able to reject 
the null hypothesis that US strikes reduce AQAP attacks.   
In the second   regression, the outcome variable log Lethality will act as proxy for 
terrorist capabilities, where the casualties of a terrorist attack represents the sophistication 
of the methods used by the terrorist group. The regression will attempt to show how 
drone strikes impact terrorist capabilities, where coefficient β1 will examine the 
percentage change in lethality when there is a one unit change in STRIKE, with β2 and β3 
retaining the same function as the first set of regressions but in relation to log lethality 
outcome variable. 
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It is also important to note that while the variable LETHALITY might provide a 
likelihood estimator, it does not perfectly represent the impact of AQAP attacks on the 
Yemeni state. For example, the assassination of an important government official could 
be more destructive to the state than the casualties of several civilians. However, the 
model does not account for the political importance of the individuals assassinated--it 
only looks at casualty levels to estimate the likelihood of a lethality, given a US strike. 
Thus, the true “disruption” of US strikes on AQAP’s strategic gains cannot be discerned 
from this model. Nevertheless, measuring casualty levels provides a reasonable proxy for 
testing the hypothesis of AQAP capabilities--generally, the greater the likelihood of a 
lethality, the more successful the group is in organizing and carrying out its attacks. 
 
 
log lethalityi = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate +  ei 
log lethalityi = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate + β3Month + ei 
log lethalityi = β0 + β1Strike + β2Governorate + β4Month*Year +  ei 
Table 3 shows the results for the preceding regressions. Similar to the modeling 
choice scenario for the outcome variable INCIDENT the third regression best fits the 
model with the lowest AIC statistic. The β1 coefficient on this model suggests that a one 
unit increase in US strike leads to a .7 percent likelihood of a lethality from an AQAP 
attack.  However, this coefficient is not statistically significant; thus I am unable to reject 
the null hypothesis that US strikes do not increase the likelihood of lethalities from 
AQAP attacks.  
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Degradation:  
In order to test hypotheses 4 and 5, I will attempt to model the impact of 
leadership decapitation on AQAP capabilities.  
 
log Incidenti = β0 + β1HVI + β2Month*Year + β3Governorate +  ei 
log Lethalityi = β0 + β1HVI + β2Month*Year + β3Governorate +  ei 
 
where the constant β0 will reflect the rate of  incidents  in a given governorate and 
month when there are no deaths of HVI. The coefficient β1 will examine the percentage 
change in lethality when there is a one-unit change in the casualty of a HVI. The 
coefficient β2 shows the differential percentage change between each month*year. Thus, 
the addition of β1 and β2 reflects the percentage change in lethality in a particular month 
and year when there is a one unit change in HVI. Similarly, the coefficient β3 shows the 
differential percentage change between each governorate.  
The second regression will attempt to show how the deaths of senior AQAP 
leaders impact the organization’s capabilities, where coefficient β1 will examine the 
percentage change in lethality when there is a one-unit change in HVI. β2 and β3 retaining 
the same function as the first regression but in relation to the outcome variable log 
lethality.  
 While Johnston and Sarbahi interacted the variable “strike” with “HVI”  
 to determine how--when controlling for drone strikes--the death high valued individuals 
impact terrorist incidents and attack lethalities. I decided not to use this approach because 
because I believe it poses some collinearity problems. A HVI casualty is a direct result of 
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a US strike, thus “HVI” correlates with the variable “strike.” If I including “strike” and 
“HVI” as explanatory variables in my model, the presence of collinearity could lower the 
predictive power of either variable. 
 Tables 4 and 5 show the results from the preceding regressions. For both outcome 
variables “Incident” and “Lethality”, coefficients are significant under governorate and 
month fixed effects, but insignificant under month-year fixed effects.  As mentioned 
before, interpreting the month-only fixed effects could pose a threat to internal validity 
due to the inter-year variation between months that could arise from unobserved 




In order to test whether the impact of US strikes differ depending on the duration 
of the attacks, I used the following regressions using time lags for the variable “strike”: 
 
 log  Incidenti = β0 + β1Striket-1 +  β2Striket-2 +  β3Striket-3  + β4Striket-4  + β5Striket-5 + 
β6Striket-6 + β7Month*Year + β8Governorate +  ei 
and 
log Lethalityi =  β0 + β1Striket-1 +  β2Striket-2 +  β3Striket-3  + β4Striket-4  + β5Striket-5 + 
β6Striket-6 + β7Month*Year + β8Governorate +  ei 
 
The duration regressions include time lags for six months, with β2 representing the 
coefficient on a one month lag (Striket-1), β3 representing the coefficient on a two month 
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lag (Striket-2 ); β4 representing the coefficient on a three month lag (Striket-3), etc. The 
coefficients show the significance of the relationship between strikes that occurred 1-6 
months prior, and the outcome variables “incident” and “lethality.” A six-month lag 
provides a lengthy window for me to assess whether the impact of US strikes on AQAP 
violence emerges with time. Furthermore, using lagged variables could allow me to 
confront some of the endogeneity problems that I previously discussed. If a strike 
happened within the window of 6 months, does it increase or decrease the violence in a 
given month and governorate? 
Table 6 describes the results, with both outcome variables INCIDENT and 
LETHALITY treated with month fixed effects (the first two columns) and month-year 
fixed effects (the last two columns). The results show a statistically significant coefficient 
for the 3-month lagged strike variable “Striket-3” at the 5 percent level. It indicates that a 
one unit increase in US Strike leads to a .14 percent decrease in the likelihood of an 
AQAP attack. However, all other lagged coefficients remain statistically insignificant. 
Thus, I am unable to confidently support either Hypothesis 6 that US Strikes have a 
sustained violence reducing impact in Yemen. 
 
Dispersion: 
 Do US Strikes disperse the violence in Yemen? In order to explore this 
hypothesis, I first tried to replicate the econometric spatial-lag approach that Johnston 
and Sarbahi used in their paper. Spatial lags work best when there is cause to believe that 
the panel data suffers from cross-sectional dependence. In the context of my analysis, 
cross-sectional dependence would mean that a US Strike in one governorate affects 
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AQAP violence in a nearby governorate. In order to rectify possible biases that could 
result from this type of cross-sectional dependence, economists and political scientists 
often use spatial lags--where the dependent variable is lagged by geographic space, with 
the radius from the observed location increasing with each additional lag. 
However, before using spatial-lags, it is customary to test whether the panel data 
suffers from cross-sectional dependence in the first place. When I conducted the Pesaran 
CD test on my regressions—the conventional test used to check if unobserved variables 
might be correlated with observed variables across cross-sections.93 I was able to reject 
the null that my errors suffered from cross-sectional dependence--meaning I could 
support the hypothesis that a US strike in one governorate does not impact AQAP 
violence in another governorate. Thus, I decided not to rely on the spatial lag model in 
my study.  
 However, in order to test whether AQAP violence shifts over time, I used arcGIS 
to map AQAP incidents and US Strikes from 2010 to 2013. Figure 8 shows the 
geographic dispersion of AQAP violence--depicted by the color gradient that ranges from 
white to deep red to indicate the levels of violence in a given governorate--and the 
geographic dispersion of US Strikes--depicted by the grey circles, whose size reflects the 
number of strikes in a given governorate. Figures 9,10,11 and 12 are magnified 
representations of 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively.  
 Note that in Figure 8, there are very few drone strikes, which correlates with the 
low intensity of AQAP attacks. In addition, the incidents seem to be located in a select 
few governorates, particularly in Abyan and Sanaa. However, after a year, Figure 9 
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suggests that while attacks continue to remain concentrated in the aforementioned 
governorates, they also seem to have spread to a growing number of other areas. This 
trend only intensifies as we look at Figures 10 and 11, which represent 2012 and 2013.  
Furthermore, it seems that the areas with the most number of incidents also have 
the most number of drone strikes. Thus, we could expect that the high number of drone 
strikes in a particular area would dissuade the militants from continuing to operate in that 
area. The visual trends seems to demonstrate the hypothesis—the greater the drone 
strikes in a given year, the more the spread of AQAP violence.  
 While I am unable to prove a causal relationship between US strikes and the 
dispersion of AQAP activities, I am able to use these visual trends to assert that some 
correlation seems to exist between the two variables.  These visual trends seem to suggest 
that drone strikes in a given governorate do not contain violence within that governorate; 
but provoke AQAP to shift its operations its violence to other governorates. If a causal 
relationship can be derived from this trend, it would suggest that the US is simply playing 
whack-a-mole with AQAP—a strike in one governorate might just yield an incident in 
another governorate.  
 
5 Anecdotal Evidence 
Although the econometric study fails to find empirical evidence that US Strikes 
disrupt, degrade, and disperse AQAP violence, a diverging body of anecdotal evidence 
does indicate that AQAP remains a viable domestic and international security threat, 
despite the American drone campaign. According to a hearing in the Subcommittee for 
Homeland Security, in the last few years, “while core al-Qaeda declined in Pakistan, 
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AQAP strengthened in Yemen…with a core membership [that] grew from approximately 
300 members in 2009 to around 1,000 in 2012…”94 The increase in recruitment coincides 
with AQAP’s most recent plots against Western targets--like the 2013 threat against the 
US Embassy that forced a shutdown on all Western embassies down for 22 days, or the 
recent January 2015 attack in Paris against the French satirical newspaper “Charlie 
Hebdo.” It seems that despite its loss of most of its command structure due to drone 
strikes, AQAP uses a variety of different mechanisms to remain a resilient organization.  
These mechanisms include (1) engaging local tribes through governance, (2) crafting a 
strong domestic and foreign propaganda machine that dissipates a single narrative that 
allows for AQAP to co opt rational local objectives with a global agenda; and finally (3) 
legitimizing a political movement through territorial gain. The following section will 
supply more in-depth observations about these mechanisms, providing explanations for 
how AQAP functions both as local insurgency and global terrorist network; and shedding 
light upon deficiencies of the current US counterterrorism policy in Yemen. 
 
5.1 Tribal Engagement 
The late AQAO cleric Anwar Awalki once said “the cradle for Jihad today are the 
tribes.”95 While the Yemeni government was set up as a parliamentary democracy, 
Yemeni tribes possess serious social and political capital, “often act[ing] as a state in 
their own right, controlling territory and imposing their own laws in the country’s rugged 
mountains.”96 AQAP, knowing that tribal affiliation will provide them much needed 
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security and sanctuary, employed a series of strategies to engage various tribal groups in 
both North and South Yemen. These strategies primarily included governance through 
public service, intermarriage, and media communications. 
 In order to initially win tribal support, AQAP promised many tribes in the Marib 
and al-Jawf its support in intertribal conflicts. 97 However, AQAP was particularly able to 
catapult its cause after the Saleh government ran a series of raids on several tribal 
regions, which sometimes left many civilians dead. As tribal groups became increasingly 
agitated with Sana’a, AQAP was able to exploit this grievance by promising vengeance 
against the Saleh regime and allegiance to the tribal sheikhs. Their allegiance came in the 
form of public service, such as offering to build schools, or through intermarriage, where 
high-level operatives married into different tribal groups.98  
Along the same line, AQAP also uses media communications as part of its tribal 
outreach effort, where each level of virtual engagement involves “a series of discourse 
before confronting tribesmen with recommendations for action.” 99 The prominence of 
videos and written statements directed towards tribal groups—along with the 
aforementioned efforts towards providing governance—indicate AQAP’s long-term 
investment in the tribal landscape. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy does not 
take into account how tribes could provide a ready-made pool of recruits for AQAP.  
According to a former deputy chief of mission to Yemen, "Drone strikes take out a few 
bad guys to be sure, but they also kill a large number of innocent civilians. Given 
Yemen’s tribal structure, the U.S. generates roughly forty to sixty new enemies for every 
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AQAP [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] operative killed by drones."100 And as civilian 
death tolls from drone strikes increase in Yemen, AQAP continues to legitimize its 
governance by leveraging the anger of tribal factions and propagating their grievances 
against US and the Yemeni state. 101As Yemeni tribes possess great political and social 
capital in Yemen, a US counterterrorism policy that marginalizes the tribal population 
could inadvertently produce more recruits for AQAP. This suggests that tribal 
engagement should play an important role in American involvement in Yemen--where a 
campaign to win the “hearts and minds” of tribal factions--should be considered over the 
current counterterrorism campaign that relies predominantly on targeted killings. 
 
5.2 The AQAP Propaganda Machine 
Multiple insurgencies and political parties battle for power in Yemen, each 
fighting for their own set of grievances and competing political ideologies. In order to set 
itself apart from these different groups, AQAP attempts to project a message that is 
unifying and inclusive to all Yemeni people—a narrative that transcends class, tribe and 
regional identity. One of the main marketing strategies that AQAP uses in the local level 
is to project itself as a paternalistic protector of Muslims around the world. This “Muslim 
Protector” narrative is not foreign to the Yemeni people. During the Afghan Mujahedeen, 
the Yemeni government and tribal leaders had pledged thousands of young men to fight 
the “holy war” against the Soviet Union. This jihad was viewed as a rite of passage for 
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many, where protecting the Muslim brothers and sisters of a foreign land embodied the 
Prophet’s battle against the unbelievers and infidels.102 
 AQAP constantly draws upon Yemen’s involvement in the Afghanistan, 
particularly by portraying the mission of AQAP as a continuation of the mujahedeen, 
where the Yemenis will once again be “pursuers of righteousness…”  [and]  “target 
criminals from America, Crusaders, and henchmen from security forces and intelligence 
officials responsible for shedding blood of women and children in Aden, Mu`ajalla 
[Abyan], al-Dal’a, Lahj, Lawdar, Marib, Ta`izz, and Shabwah.”103 
 Even this particular statement, which was from a video release in February 2011 
in a series called Masar ‘al-Khuna (“Fighter of Traitors”), is testament to how AQAP 
promotes the narrative that jihad the only solution to all the popular grievances of the 
Yemeni people. 104  Furthermore, since Yemen had played an instrumental role in 
providing foreign fighters for the Afghan Mujahedeen, the idea of fighting for a similar 
domestic cause could be presented in the familiar “Mujahedeen” platform. Similarly, by 
claiming reference to the Mujahedeen, AQAP presents itself as a reflection of local 
population and the global community of subjugated Muslims.  By declaring jihad to be 
the only solution to all the popular grievances of the Muslim people, AQAP is able to 
merge its local and global ambitions in a narrative that could be palatable to both 
Yemenis and foreigners alike. However, having a unified narrative is useless without 
having the proper mechanisms to voice the message. Using a variety of mediums and 
technologies, AQAP has been able to establish a strong publicity arm that serves to create 
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a local and foreign support base and provides a major tool for recruitment of operatives. 
The complex propaganda machine of AQAP primarily seeks to (1) delegitimize the 
Yemeni government, (2) exploit popular grievances Yemeni of the people, (3) and 
provide theological arguments (especially using Sharia law) to recruit, develop support, 
and justify its attacks.  
 
 5.21 Sada al-Malahim  
In seeking a Yemen permissive for terrorism, AQAP has worked to position itself 
as the foremost legitimate means for expressing discontent with the political status quo. 
One of the main ways that AQAP delegitimizes Sana’a is by characterizing the 
government as un-Islamic, claiming that it neither represents the interests of the people 
nor the principles of Islam. In 2008, the group began publishing a magazine, Sada al-
Malahim ("The Echo of Battle"), which helped to spread its ideological message in 
Yemen and around the region. Many of its issues focus on the corruption in Sana’a, the 
lack of public service, Saleh’s ties to the United States, and the movement towards 
secularization.105  
Apart from spelling out the grievances the group holds against the Yemeni 
government, the magazine also speaks out strongly against West and why the Yemeni 
people must withdraw their allegiance from the “apostate” government in Sana`a and 
transfer their loyalty to more legitimate leaders, who will expel all non-Muslim interests 
from the Arabian Peninsula and establish the application of Islamic law.”106 In one of the 
issues, the Mohammed al-Qahtani, the former Guantanamo Bay Detainee who was 	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allegedly involved in the September 11 attacks, issued a statement in Sada about why the 
Yemeni Mujahedeen will be emblematic of the fall of the West: 
 
My choice was based on two reasons, the first and most important is a 
religious reason, as the Almighty said “Fight the unbelievers who are 
near to you, and let them find harshness in you,” and to execute the 
commandment of the messenger of God, who said “expel the 
polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula” and to liberate al-Qibla of 
Muslims and the mosque of Mustafa and to cleanse the land of the 
peninsula . . . from the filth of the polytheists and apostates… If the 
interests of the enemy in the Arabian Peninsula were hit and the 
funding from oil was stopped and the oil refineries were destroyed, 
the enemy would collapse, and it would not only withdraw from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but it would completely collapse. If it were to be hit 
from various locations, it would withdraw humiliated from the land of 
Mohammed…107 
 
The presence of such propaganda allows AQAP to evoke the religious 
significance of fighting the jihad in Yemen, which can serve a recruitment tool for local 
fighters while elevating the significance of Yemen’s place in the global jihad. Current 
counterterrorism efforts in Yemen should consider the importance of local propaganda 
output: if drone strikes are unable to stop the publishing of local arabic language 
magazines such as Sada al-Malahim --which also holds an online presence--then AQAP 
can still remain successful in attracting and possibly mobilizing new members.  
 
5.22 INSPIRE Magazine  
AQAP’s Western strategy advances a second aim distinct from the group’s 
objectives in Yemen. While Sada al-Malahim calls for Yemenis to join the fight against 	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  Abu Hamam al-Qahtani, “Liqa’ M’a Ahad al-Matlubin,” Sada al-Malahim 1 (13 January 2008), 7–8. 
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the West through the AQAP front, Inspire, AQAP’s English-language magazine, does not 
seek to recruit foreign fighters for the Yemeni movement. Instead, it provokes its readers 
to become lone-wolf jihadists, prompting them to take on their own jihad within their 
own communities, without seeking guidance or military training abroad. For example, the 
magazine lays out how very few tools are necessary to carry out an attack: 
 
Two Nokia mobiles, $150 each, two HP printers, $300 each, plus 
shipping, transportation and other miscellaneous expenses add up to a 
total bill of $4,200. That is all what [sic] Operation Hemorrhage cost 
us. In terms of time it took us three months to plan and execute the 
operation from beginning to end. On the other hand this supposedly 
“foiled plot”, as some of our enemies would like to call [it], will 
without a doubt cost America and other Western countries billions of 
dollars in new security measures. That is what we call leverage.108 
 
Although Awlaki was killed by a drone strike in 2011, Inspire continues to publish issues 
online. The magazine is well crafted, complete with color schemes and layouts using 
InDesign software. This best exemplifies how the threat of AQAP does not necessarily 
rest upon its physical capability of attacking the Western homeland; rather, the AQAP 
threat depends upon its ability to spread radical ideology to a foreign audience through 
innovative, accessible platforms. In May 2013, two Chechen brothers bombed the Boston 
Marathon, killing a few and injuring hundreds more. The Tsarnaev brothers allegedly 
acted alone as lone wolves, waging their own personal jihad against the United States. 
However, they began their journey to radicalization after watching sermons of Anwar 
Awlaki on Youtube and then reading Inspire magazine, which provided detailed 
instructions on how to construct an undetectable homemade bomb. In this case, AQAP 	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somehow inadvertently played an important role in enabling the actions of terrorists, who 
were able to carry out AQAP’s jihad without ever having stepped into the mountainous 
sanctuary tucked in the hinterlands of Yemen. The fact that AQAP can export its violence 
to Western countries without using operatives suggests another deficiency in the 
American counterterrorism policy. 
 
5.3 Territorial Gain: 
Bin Laden once pointed out in late 1996 that in Yemen, “the topography is 
mountainous, [the] people are tribal, armed, and allow one to breathe clear air 
unblemished with humiliation.”109 Alliances with tribes of mountainous would provide 
AQAP with the most important form of security: freedom from law enforcement. By 
establishing base in ungoverned space, AQAP could operate free from the threat of law 
enforcement while still enjoying the benefits of a viable recruitment base. 
 Many sources indicate that AQAP has developed strongholds in the governorates 
of Ma’rib, Shabwah, and al Jawf through its relationships with tribal sheiks. In Southern 
Yemen, an AQAP insurgent group called “Ansar al Sharia” began to take hold in the 
Abyan governorate. By securing control of these different governorates in the North and 
South, AQAP could take control of historic trafficking routes that pass through parts of 
Marib, al-Jawf and Abyan, which would further assist the group in securing funding from 
supporters in Sauid Arabia.110 
Ansar al Sharia best exemplifies AQAP’s attempt at crafting an insurgency.. In 
distinguishing itself from the al Qaeda terrorist affiliate, AAS presents itself as legitimate, 	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Ganesh	   47	  
political entity, with propaganda videos showing “AAS connecting electricity lines in 
Ja’ar suburbs and images of electric lights and fans operating correctly.”111 By providing 
a form of governance to the locals, AAS also integrates itself with both the urban and 
tribal framework of Abyan. 
Senior AQAP cleric Abu Zubayr Adel al-Abab, has said “the name Ansar al-
Shari’a is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work, to tell people 
about our work and goals.”112 Mohammed al-Bashar, the Yemeni Embassy’s official 
spokesman in Washington, D.C., described AAS as “AQAP’s attempt to empower local 
jihadi-linked actors with ties to AQAP, and rebrand the movement under a global positive 
banner... After all, who would dare say no to Islamic law?”113 Moreover, AAS and AQAP 
have a symbiotic relationship. The two groups “feed on each other. They support each 
other. They certainly are related, but they’re not identical.”114 
 While AAS has lost some territory after the Yemeni government led a series of 
counter terrorism raids in 2012, the group continues to operate in the region and still 
poses a threat to the Yemeni security. Furthermore, considering the recent coup d’état, 
the Yemeni government no longer posses the military or law enforcement forces to quell 
an AAS rebellion if it were to happen. As current US counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency efforts do not seem to have sufficiently thwarted AAS expansion, 
additional measures must be considered. If AAS gains the capabilities to stage a coup 
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against the sitting Shiite government, then essentially, AQAP will have successfully 
taken control over the Yemeni state 
 
6 Implications and Conclusions 
 Through this thesis, I set out to investigate whether the current US 
counterterrorism policy in Yemen sufficiently addresses the domestic and international 
threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. Using violence as a proxy for AQAP’s 
capabilities, I first relied on regression analysis in order to estimate the relationship 
between US Strikes and AQAP militancy. The empirical strategy utilized count 
regression models—particularly the Poisson and the Negative Binomial models—and 
incorporated governorate and month-year fixed effects to account for time-invariant 
factors and temporal variation.  With these models, I tested several hypotheses on two 
different outcome variables—(1) number of terrorist incidents and (2) number of people 
killed from terrorist incidents—in order to determine whether a causal relationship 
existed between US Strikes and AQAP violence. 
 The results from my experiment indicate that no consistent, causal relationship 
exists between the two aforementioned variables, contradicting the findings of Johnston 
and Sarbahi (2015) that claim that drone strikes have a violence reducing impact on 
militant groups. On the other hand, my thesis is also unable to confidently assert that US 
strikes have a violence increasing effect, as none of my coefficients from my 
econometric model pass the statistical significance threshold.  
Nevertheless, trends within the data indicate that AQAP violence and US strikes 
are highly correlated, suggesting that the current counterterrorism policy has done little to 
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curb the violence. It seems to follow that when drone strikes increases, AQAP violence 
simultaneously increases, and vice versa. Similarly, mapping data also reveals that the 
dispersion of AQAP violence is associated with an increase in US strikes. Through the 
maps, we can see visual trends of AQAP violence geographically moving away from 
drone strikes and increasing in other parts of the country. This indicates that the US 
counterterrorism policy does not sufficiently contain the violence geographically—it just 
displaces it somewhere else. 
However, these trends must be observed with caution. The age-old “correlation is 
not causation” argument especially applies here due to possible endogeniety problems 
between the outcome variable and the independent variable. Thus, additional empirical 
research is needed on the topic to understand how causality fits into the framework. 
Perhaps a more robust model could use random effects instead of fixed effects—having 
more observable explanatory variables in the dataset could allow for more sophisticated 
econometric analysis and could alleviate measurement errors from omitted variable bias. 
Unfortunately, due to my limited access to data, I could only rely on a fixed effects model 
in order to test my hypotheses. However, I believe that with access to other governorate-
level data on variables such as GDP, unemployment, youth population, access to internet, 
etc. could allow for the numbers to tell a much more interesting story. Thus, I believe the 
US should consider investing more resources into empirically evaluating the impact of its 
counterterrorism policy in Yemen and/or in other countries where drone warfare is 
becoming popularized. Then, rather than simply relying on political rhetoric in the 
decision to enter wars, the public and policymakers alike can have access to empirical 
hindsight regarding the effectiveness of this hallmark US counterterrorism policy. 
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However, until then, plenty of anecdotal evidence indicates that air and drone 
strikes are doing little to thwart the AQAP threat in Yemen. AQAP is an intelligent 
organization. Using a variety of different mechanisms, it has been able to manage a local 
insurgency while sponsoring a global terrorist network. Through tribal engagement, 
AQAP was able to spark an insurgent arm in southern Yemen. Through a single, unifying 
narrative that calls for a Yemeni mujahedeen—one to protect all subjugated Muslims--
AQAP has been able to exploit the grievances of the Yemeni people, prompting a call for 
arms against the Yemeni government and Western influence in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Through its variety of media platforms, AQAP has been able to project its radical 
ideology to an international audience. 
 By coopting a local agenda within the larger, global jihad framework, AQAP has 
been able to build a strong Yemeni base while still spreading its influence abroad. When 
thinking about counterterrorism policies against Yemen, this local/global dynamic must 
become part of the discussion. A persistent air campaign may disrupt the AQAP, but it 
does little to dismantle the deep historic roots of mujahedeen and jihadism in Southern 
Yemen, or curb the bellowing voice of Anwar Awlaki’s ghost readily available on 
Youtube or Inspire. It is important to acknowledge that AQAP pursues a variety of 
strategies to achieve its goals: it can simultaneously display the organizational 
characteristics of a terrorist group, the tactics of a guerilla movement, and a rhetoric of a 
political party. By understanding the multi-dimensional way that AQAP operates, U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts should consider counterinsurgency efforts—where the civilian 
population becomes the focus rather than the terrorist network—and find a multifaceted 
way to address the many elements that continue to keep AQAP strong. By doing so, the 
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United States can allow for the Yemeni government to regain some of its legitimacy 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 


























Number of Observations 1008 
 
 
Impact of US Strikes on AQAP incidents 
 1 2 3 
  
Strike 1.3822*** 1.3406*** 1.1702* 
    (0.0624) 
 
(0.0635) (.1037) 




Governorate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 































*P<.10, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
Note 1: All results are reported as incidence rate ratios (IRR) The IRR represents the 
change in the dependent variable in terms of a percentage increase or decrease, with the 
precise percentage determined by the amount the IRR is either above or below 1. For 
example, the coefficient on strike from the third regression could be interpreted as a 17.02 









 Impact of US Strikes on incident lethality 
 
 1 2 3 
  
Strike     1.088 1.1365 1.007 
    (0.2802) 
 
(.30412) (.2712) 




Governorate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 




































Table 4: Impact of HVI casualties on AQAP Attacks 
 
 1 2 3 
   
HVI    1.3899* 1.4696** 1.1597 
    (0.2407) 
 
(0.2562) (0.1749) 




Governorate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 































*P<.10, **P<.05, ***P<.01 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of HVI casualties on incident lethalities 
 
 1 2 3 
   
HVI    1.2324 1.2457 1.0220 
    (0.4817) 
 
(0.5298) (0.3803) 




Governorate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 


































































   
   Lethality 
     
Strike 1.3215** 0.8894 1.1605 0.9774 
 (0.1370) (0.2510) (0.1131) (0.2814) 
Strike t-1 1.2765** 1.8170 1.1131 1.1031 
 (0.1488) (0.6096) (0.1103) (0.3085) 
Strike t-2 1.0714 0.7871 0.9959** 0.6835 
 (0.1288) (0.2522) (0.0960) (0.2019) 
Strike t-3 0.96834 1.1923 0.9657 1.1627 
 (0.1105) (0.3733) (0.1001) (0.3436) 
Strike t-4 1.1531 0.9407 1.1082 0.8921 
 (0.1304) (0.2851) (0.1084) (0.2526) 
Strike t-5 1.1678 1.0849 1.1408 1.2289 
 (0.1458) (0.3207) (0.1273) (0.3794) 
Strike t-6 0.9759 0.9624 0.8939 0.8118 
 (0.1132) (0.3039) (0.0937) (0.2157) 
Governorate Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No 
Month-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1008 1008 1008 1008 
AIC 1167.87 1638.4 1136.8 1566.9 
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Figure 1: US Strikes in Yemen from 2002 to 2014
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Figure 4: US Strikes and AQAP Attacks 2011
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Figure 5: US Strikes and AQAP Attacks 2012
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Figure	  7:	  Time	  Trends	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Figure 8: AQAP violence and US Strikes from 2010 to 2011 
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Figure 10: AQAP violence and US Strikes in 2011 
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Figure 11: AQAP violence and US Strikes in 2012 
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Figure 12: AQAP violence and US Strikes in 2013 
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